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Abstract
The article examines the problematic aspects of recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments in the European Union in relation to the application of the public 
policy clause. Analysis of the content of public order also constitutes part of the article. 
It focuses on the EU law instruments which provide unequal conditions for non-recog-
nition of foreign judgments. The authors discuss if inclusion in the CJEU of the limits 
on the interpretation of the public order clause is a sufficient guarantee to ensure proper 
application of the public order clause. Moreover, the authors analyse the principle of res 
judicata according the EU law.
Keywords: recognition of foreign judgments, public order, res judicata, European 
Union law.
Free Movement of Judgments and 
Public Order Exception
The growing number of disputes with an international dimension causes a need 
in the European Union (thereinafter – EU) to ensure an effective protection of the civil 
rights. One of the preconditions for achieving this goal is simplification of the enforcement 
of judgments of the courts of the Member States of the EU in civil matters throughout 
the Union. To achieve this goal, the EU legislation in civil (commercial) cases has abol-
ished exequatur (the requirement to recognise a judgment before it is enforced) and 
enshrined the principle of free movement of judgments. 
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The exercise of the right to a judicial remedy is not limited to adoption of a judg-
ment as a single final act on the substance of the dispute. Implementation of the right 
to judicial protection and effective protection of subjective rights of persons or inter-
ests protected by law depend on enforcement of court decisions (Tamošiūnienė, 2007). 
In 1997, the European Court of Human Rights (thereinafter – ECHR) ruled in case 
Hornsby vs Greece that a judgment given by any court must be enforced and that enforce-
ment proceedings must therefore be regarded as an integral part of the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Convention). In the context 
of the objectives of Article 6 of the Convention, if domestic law did not ensure the enforce-
ment of court decisions, then the right to a fair trial would be illusory [4].
Judicial cooperation developed by the EU in civil matters is based on the prin-
ciple of mutual recognition of judicial and extrajudicial decisions 1. The first ideas of 
the free movement of judgments in the EU can be traced back to the treaty establishing 
the European Economic Community (also known as the Treaty of Rome) 2.
For implementation of Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome on simplification of for-
malities for recognition and enforcement of judgments and arbitration awards between 
Member States, the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters was adopted 3. Article 26 (1) of that conven-
tion provided that a judgment given in a Contracting State is to be recognised in other 
Contracting States without any special procedure being required, but such judgment is 
to be enforced only at the request of the person concerned.
Although effective implementation of the principle of free movement of judgments 
has been identified as one of the basic preconditions for the creation of a common and 
efficient market since establishment of the European Economic Community, Article 27 of 
the Brussels Convention provided exceptions of this principle. One of the exceptions pro-
vided for in that convention was the ground for refusal to recognise a judgment given in 
a Member State if such recognition would be contrary to public policy in the Contracting 
State in which recognition is sought 4.
It is generally accepted that a court decision is one of the expressions of the state 
power. Therefore, its power is normally limited to the territory of the State in which 
the decision was rendered (Rijavec et al., 2018). However, the socio-economic situation 
obliges states to respect foreign judgments, but even in the twenty-first century the enforce-
ment of a foreign judgment is still considered an interference with the sovereignty of 
another state (Rijavec et al., 2018, Jokubauskas et al., 2020). Moreover, the exception of 
 1 Article 81 of the Treaty on European Union, OJ C 202, 2016, 13–46.
 2 Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome provides that Member States will, where necessary, negotiate 
among themselves in the interests of their nationals with a view to simplifying formalities for mutual 
recognition and enforcement of judgments and arbitration awards.
 3 Preamble to the Brussels Convention (1968).
 4 Article 27 (1) of the Brussels Convention (1968).
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public order seeks to ensure protection of state sovereignty and constitutional order of 
each state. However, at both theoretical and practical levels, application of this clause to 
this day raises various issues.
Historically, a number of doubts have been expressed about this clause during 
the discussion of the draft Brussels Convention. It has been criticised as being con-
trary to the principle of free movement of judgments within the European Economic 
Community (Kaye, 1987). Critics feared that it would allow states to abuse its application, 
thus defeating the main aim of the convention, which was to create a European market 
based on mutual trust between Member States (Minehan, 1996). However, proponents of 
this clause considered these fears exaggerated and unfounded due to the limited practical 
application of this clause (Minehan, 1996).
Despite criticisms mentioned, public order has remained a condition for non-rec-
ognition of judgments in modern European Union law on the recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments in civil matters. For example, Article 45 (1) (a) of the Brussels Ia 
Regulation provides that at the request of any interested party, a judgment shall not be 
recognised if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy (ordre public) in 
the Member State addressed. An essentially analogous public policy clause is contained 
in Article 22 (a) of the Brussels IIa Regulation, Article 40 (a) of the Succession Regulation, 
Article 24 (a) of the Maintenance Regulation and Article 34 (2) of the European Account 
Preservation Procedure Regulation.
However, Article 23 (a) of the Brussels IIa Regulation provides that a judgment 
relating to parental responsibility shall not be recognised if such recognition is mani-
festly contrary to the public policy of the Member State in which recognition is sought 
considering the best interests of the child. In assessing this provision of this regulation, 
the question arises as to how the balance between public policy and the best interests of 
the child should be reconciled; where the balance between these two interests lies.
The ECHR in case Karrer vs Romania found that in the sensitive area of family 
relations, the State is not only bound to refrain from taking measures which would hinder 
the effective enjoyment of family life, but, depending on the circumstances of each case, 
should take positive action in order to ensure the effective exercise of such rights [5]. In 
this area the decisive issue is whether a fair balance between the competing interests 
at stake – those of the child, of the two parents, and of public order was struck within 
the margin of appreciation afforded to States in such matters, bearing in mind, however, 
that the child’s best interests must be the primary consideration [3].
The public policy clause is also enshrined in Article 33 of the Insolvency 
Regulation, according to which any Member State may refuse to recognise insolvency 
proceedings instituted in another Member State or to enforce a judgment given in 
such proceedings if such recognition or enforcement would be manifestly contrary 
to public policy, in particular its fundamental principles, or constitutional rights and 
freedoms of the individual. Unlike other regulations mentioned above, the public policy 
clause is the only ground for non-recognition of judgments in insolvency proceedings. 
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The application of this clause in the Insolvency Regulation is linked to a manifest breach 
of public policy. Taking into account that the public order clause is the only non-recog-
nition clause in the Insolvency Regulation, the authors consider that the requested state 
may refuse to recognise a decision that is manifestly contrary to public policy, especially 
when its effect is to restrict fundamental rights and freedoms, or on the grounds of 
public policy where the principles of due process have been breached (for example, 
breach of defense rights and the principle of audi alteram partem; impartiality of 
the court).
It should be noted that not all EU legislative initiatives in civil matters include 
a public order as non-recognition and non-enforcement clause. Such legislation includes 
the European Order for Payment Regulation and the Small Claims Procedure Regulation. 
Both of these EU regulations govern summary civil proceedings, and the aim of these 
initiatives is to speed up recovery of outstanding debts in the EU.
The question therefore arises as to whether the public policy clause on recognition 
and enforcement of judgments is losing its meaning and the Member States are moving 
towards full mutual trust. On the contrary, the question is whether this indicates a dif-
ferent level of mutual trust between Member States in certain areas. In the opinion of 
authors, absence of a public order clause in these regulations could have been due to two 
aspects. First, for example, the European Account Preservation Order establishes a pro-
cedural instrument to enforce a future decision. Secondly, the Small Claims Procedure 
Regulation introduces a simplified procedure for the recovery of debts up to EUR 5000. 
Such a limited nature of the application of that regulation may have undermined the con-
fidence of the Member States in the area.
Interpretation and Application of 
the Public Order Clause
The public policy clause undoubtedly concerns the fundamental rights and free-
doms of the European Union, as well as economic relations. According to the European 
Commission, rapid debt recovery is essential for economic operators in the European 
Union and for proper functioning of the internal market 5. Since the application of 
the public policy clause directly determines enforcement of a judgment given in another 
Member State, its autonomous application and interpretation in the Member States also 
affects proper functioning of the internal market of the European Union.
Public policy is one of the grounds for non-recognition of a foreign judgment, 
which must be interpreted narrowly. Such an interpretation of public order determines 
that although the decision of a foreign court does not comply with the legal regulation 
of the Republic of Lithuania, it is not a ground for applying this clause in itself (Kirkutis 
et al., 2020).
 5 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_05_296.
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Although the public order clause has been laid down in various legislations of 
the European Union, the concept of this clause and its content are not disclosed in any 
of them. The question of the content of public order was first referred to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in 1974 in Yvonne Van Duyn vs Home Office, where 
the Court took the traditional view that public policy is a national concept (i.e. the spe-
cific public policy of each Member State), which may change over time [2]. The CJEU 
has held a broadly similar position in subsequent cases; however, in subsequent case law 
has narrowed autonomy of Member States in interpreting and applying the public policy 
clause, stating that Member States are free to determine the content of the concept of 
public policy [1].
Thus, the abstract and unclear content and concept of the public policy clause 
raises problematic issues at both practical and doctrinal levels regarding proper imple-
mentation of this clause, compatibility with the principle of free movement of decisions in 
the European Union, and protection of state sovereignty and constitutional order.
Recognition of a foreign judgment is a judicial process in which provisions of 
the Convention shall also apply. Although the Convention does not establish specific 
criteria and requirements for recognition of foreign judgments, guidelines on application 
of certain public policy clauses are set out in the case law of the ECHR. For example, in 
case Négrépontis-Giannisis vs Greece, the court recognised the obligation to recognise 
a foreign judgment (family law) in accordance with Article 6 (1) of the Convention. This 
case concerned an illegal refusal by the Greek authorities to recognise a foreign judgment, 
provided that in order to recognise and enforce a foreign judgment under the Greek law 
several conditions had to be laid down. One of these conditions was that a foreigner 
judgment cannot infringe Greek public order. The ECHR ruled that the concept of public 
policy cannot be interpreted unlawfully and disproportionately (fr. manière arbitration 
and disproportion) [6]. Thus, the application of a public order clause cannot be dispro-
portionate and infringe the right of individuals to recognise a foreign judgment.
Lithuanian case law recognises that a provision of public order may be invoked 
when recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment in the Republic of Lithuania 
is incompatible with its legal system and contrary to fundamental principles of law. 
In such cases, the risk must arise from manifest infringement of a rule of law which 
is considered to be fundamental in the legal system of the state in which the recogni-
tion and enforcement of the foreign judgment is questioned or which is considered to 
be fundamental in that legal system [12]. The term “public order” shall be construed 
as including international public policy, which includes fundamental principles of due 
process as well as mandatory rules of law which establish fundamental and universally 
recognised principles of law [13].
As a result, not every objection (even to mandatory legal norms of the Republic of 
Lithuania) may be a sufficient ground for non-recognition of a foreign court decision. 
Cases where it is established that recognition and enforcement of a judgment of a foreign 
state would be in conflict with the basic principles of law and moral norms established at 
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the international level established by the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania shall 
be recognised as a violation of public order [14]. The purpose of public order is to protect 
the basic, fundamental interests of the state and society, i.e., the concept of public policy 
includes the basic principles on which the legal system of the state, the functioning of 
the state and society are based [15].
At doctrinal and international levels, distinction is made between procedural and 
material public order. The latter is rarely applied in practice because of the clear prohibi-
tion in the EU law governing the recognition and enforcement of judgments on reviewing 
the correct application and interpretation of the law by a court of another Member State 
and on the merits of the substance of the dispute. Thus, the fact that a national court 
deciding on the non-recognition of a judgment has applied a different rule of law or 
resolved a dispute between individuals in a different way is not a sufficient ground for 
not recognising a judgment given in another Member State. The fundamental problem 
with the substantive public policy clause, however, is its relationship to morality. It is 
generally argued that fundamental principles of morality can be attributed to a substantive 
public policy clause; however, the content of public order, and morality in particular, is 
so vague and varied that their application requires special attention. Unjustified refusal 
to recognise a judgment given in another Member State may undermine protection of 
the individual right of such a person and the effectiveness of the right to a fair trial. 
Also, unreasonable refusal of a person’s request to refuse to recognise and enforce such 
a decision may deny sovereignty of the state recognising the decision, the constitutional 
order or the moral norms recognised and respected in that society.
On the other hand, giving national courts the power to interpret the content of 
public policy exclusively could, in principle, jeopardize one of the European Union key 
objectives of creating a European market based on mutual trust between Member States 
and simplifying recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments by abolishing for-
malities and ensuring their free movement. Therefore, although discretion to interpret 
the concept of public policy is vested in the courts of the Member States, i. e. Member 
States are free to determine the content of the concept of public policy, interpretation of 
the limits of this concept is a matter for the CJEU. By refusing to recognise and enforce 
a judgment given in another Member State, national courts are free to identify the rules 
which are to be regarded as part of public policy in a given Member State, but whether 
those rules are in fact equivalent to public policy (where a reference is made by a national 
court), decided by the CJEU.
However, the authors discuss whether inclusion in the CJEU of the limits on 
the interpretation of the public order clause is a sufficient guarantee to ensure proper 
application of the public order clause, given that obligation to refer a question to the CJEU 
is limited to the court seized. Flexibility and uncertainty of the public policy clause raises 
the issue of ensuring uniform interpretation and application of the clause, as the EU law 
rules (other than a reference to the CJEU by a court of origin) do not provide for other 
measures to ensure effective exercise of their right to a fair trial.
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Res judicata Principle in EU 
The principle of res judicata means that an adjudicated issue cannot be re-litigated 
(Minssen and Groussot, 2007). The effect of applying the principle of res judicata is mani-
fested in two aspects: the negative and the positive. The negative effect of the principle 
of res judicata is that the parties cannot re-bring an identical action (non bis in idem), 
while the positive effect of the principle of res judicata is that the judgment can be used as 
a basis for a claim in another civil case, i.e., the judgment acquires a preliminary ruling and 
the findings of fact cannot be challenged by the parties in other cases (Mikelėnas, 1997).
The EU principle of res judicata, which is applied directly in a domestic court 
of a member state when dealing with a dispute falling within the scope of EU law, has 
a number of strands. One is known as relative res judicata and is applied where a second 
action is brought between the same parties, dealing with the same subject matter and based 
on the same grounds as an earlier action. However, this case concerns a distinct strand 
known as absolute res judicata or, to use its full Latin tag, res judicata erga omnes. This is 
intended to convey that, where the principle applies, a judicial decision is given dispositive 
effect which is binding not simply on the parties to the decision but on everyone.
Analysing the effects of res judicata, it is important to consider one CJEU case 
dealing with the question whether a court in the Member State addressed is bound 
by the circumstances of a foreign judgment where the court of origin refused to hear 
a dispute under an agreement conferring jurisdiction. The Court stated in case Gothaer 
Allgemeine Versicherung AG that since a court of the Member State of origin had rec-
ognised the validity of such a jurisdiction clause in reviewing its jurisdiction, it would 
be contrary to the principle of mutual trust in administration of justice in the European 
Union of the court of requested Member State. The Court also noted that a judgment 
of a court of a Member State, declaring that it has no jurisdiction on the ground that 
the clause is valid, is binding on the courts of other Member States as regards the conclu-
sion reached in the operative part of the judgment. Lack of jurisdiction of that court and 
the conclusion as to the validity of that condition are the grounds of that judgment, which 
are necessary for adoption of the operative part of the judgment. In such circumstances, 
it is recognised that the court seized a judgment in which a court of another Member 
State has declared that it has no jurisdiction to rule on the substance of the dispute and 
is bound by the statement of reasons in the judgment declaring the action inadmissible 
on the validity of that condition.
Thus, discussing recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, the question 
arises whether the judgment of a Member State, refusing to recognize a judgment given 
in another Member State in a decision on procedural irregularities in proceedings in 
the State of origin, has the res judicata effect in another Member State. 
In the perspective of the current research, judgment of a court of a Member State 
refusing to recognise a judgment given in another Member State by a court of another 
Member State per se shall not have the force of res judicata in another Member State. This 
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conclusion must be drawn in the light of possible differences in public policy between 
the Member States. However, a court of another Member State should consider infringe-
ments found in another Member State by the court of the State of origin and assess 
whether such an infringement is contrary to public policy in that Member State.
Conclusions
Application of a public policy clause in the European Union law in civil matters 
is not uniform. Interpretation and application of the public policy clause is also left to 
the courts of the Member States, but this does not guarantee uniform implementation 
of the principle of free movement of judgments in the EU.
A judgment of a court of a Member State refusing to recognise a judgment given 
in another Member State by a court of another Member State per se shall not have 
the force of res judicata in another Member State due to differences of public order among 
the Member States. However, infringements found by one Member State court should 
be considered by another Member State, evaluating it according to the public order of 
the respective Member State. 
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